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PUNISHMENT: DESERT AND 
CRIME CONTROL 
Ernest van den Haag* 
PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS 
IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS. By Andrew von Hirsch. New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1985. Pp. xiv, 220. $25. 
REDISCOVERING RETRIBUTION 
Andrew von Hirsch has had a major role in making the part retri-
bution plays in doing justice respectable once more, 1 after it had been 
relegated to near oblivion in favor of rehabilitation.2 He has helped 
matters along by rechristening retribution "just deserts." And why 
not? It is a catchy name (although pleonastic: "unjust deserts" would 
be oxymoronic). The reacceptance of retribution was helped when it 
was revealed, at long last, that rehabilitation by means other than age 
was far too rare to warrant sentences tailored to so unlikely a 
prospect.3 
In Past or Future Crimes Professor von Hirsch discusses rehabilita-
tion briefly and deterrence occasionally to focus on the most recent 
sentencing theory: "selective incapacitation." Rehabilitation, deter-
rence, and selective incapacitation propose sentences primarily meant 
to control crime through sanctions based on the predicted future be-
havior of convicts (or, in the case of deterrence, of prospective offend-
ers). Wherefore Professor von Hirsch rejects them. He wants 
sentences to be determined by past behavior - by what is deserved for 
the crime already committed. Sentences must be morally just, regard-
less of future effects on convicts or others. In the Kantian tradition, 
punishment is not treated as a means of crime control, but primarily as 
a deontological moral act, an end (if not a good) in itself.4 Laws must 
prescribe and coUrts must impose the sentences crimes deserve. 
Professor von Hirsch makes his points in workmanlike, if not ele-
* John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy, Fordham University. - Ed. 
1. See A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976). 
2. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949), Justice Black expressed a common 
contemporary view: "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law." 
3. See D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & w. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL 
TREATMENT (1975). 
4. Unlike Professor von Hirsch, Kant did not always ignore deterrence. In his Lectures on 
Ethics Kant wrote: "Ruling authorities do not punish because a crime has been committed, but 
in order that crimes should not be committed." I. KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 56 (Methuen 
Library Reprints 1979). 
1250 
April-May 1987] Punishment 1251 
gant prose. Cryptic phrases, such as "[s]elective incapacitation neces-
sarily invalues such infringement" (p. 171), stand out because 
fortunately rare. Throughout, he reproaches - or, as he writes, 
reprobates - those interested in crime control for neglecting what is 
deserved. He asserts, although he does not much argue, the absolute 
priority of justice (retribution). It sounds good. Is he right? A satis-
factory punishment certainly must be perceived to do justice. Yet it 
must serve to control crime as well. If either of these two purposes of 
the criminal justice system is dropped, or neglected in favor of the 
other, we get a tidy, but not very helpful theory. Such is the case with 
Past or Future Crimes, despite Professor van Hirsch's occasional ges-
tures toward crime control. They make his "just deserts" theory less 
tidy, but not more helpful. 
By threatening future crimes the criminal law means to deter (con-
trol) them. (Threats always are meant to deter.) By punishing those 
who were not deterred (criminals), we carry out legal threats and 
make them credible. Further, by punishing offenders as threatened by 
law, we do justice. Professor van Hirsch insists that to do justice 
criminals must be punished according to what is deserved by the seri-
ousness of their crimes. Fine. However, he implies, or at times as-
serts, that he has succeeded in establishing a nonarbitrary relationship 
between crime, desert, and appropriate punishment. I don't think he, 
or anyone, has. 
Professor von Hirsch is right in rejecting sentences addressed pri-
marily to the future behavior of offenders. Sentences based on pros-
pects for rehabilitation, or on the need for incapacitation, would make 
justice irrelevant by dealing with criminality as a disease requiring 
treatment, or as a condition requiring isolation - as though the crimi-
nal were not a morally responsible person who deserves blame and 
punishment in some proportion to his crime, just as others may de-
serve praise and reward for their achievements. 5 
Diseases do not deserve blame; and treatments are neither just nor 
unjust, only effective or ineffective. Criminal behavior obviously lacks 
the characteristics usually associated with disease, such as involuntari-
ness and undesiredness. Further, disease, unlike criminality, shortens 
life, or is painful, or disabling. Finally, the criminal "disease" is vol-
untary while the "treatment" is not - the reverse of what ordinarily 
characterizes diseases. Thus, the idea of criminality as illness (and of 
treatment instead of punishment) is quite unpersuasive. It gained cur-
rency only because in the nineteenth century blame, as part of an ex-
trascientific morality, was unacceptable to emancipated social 
scientists. The disestablishment of rehabilitation as a sentencing crite-
5. Barbara Wootton in Crime and the Criminal Law was explicit in arguing that "the formal 
distinction between prison and hospital [should be] •.• obliterated altogether." B. WoorroN, 
CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 79-80 (1963). 
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rion, however, does not establish Professor von Hirsch's claims for just 
deserts. Neither does the unjustifiability of "selective incapacitation." 
Selective incapacitation shares some of the crucial weaknesses of 
rehabilitation as a sentencing criterion, although it drops the over-op-
timistic prospect of "cure" and the inappropriate medical model. Se-
lective incapacitation proposes to incarcerate for as long as possible -
ideally until they are no longer dangerous - the convicts predicted to 
recidivate frequently. While incapacitated they could not commit (ex-
tramural) crimes; this is expected to reduce the crime rate. Convicts 
thought unlikely to recidivate would be incarcerated for a shorter 
time, even though they had committed the same crime and had a simi-
lar conviction record. Professor von Hirsch objects convincingly that 
the predictability of recidivism is insufficient for the proposed selec-
ti9n. He argues further that it would lead to unequal sentences for the 
same crime and, for offenders predicted to recidivate often, to 
sentences disproportionate to the crimes so far committed. He is 
right. Sentences would be determined by predictions as precarious as 
they are irrelevant to what is deserved for the crimes already 
committed. 
Professor von Hirsch compromises retributionist theory some-
what. Although rejecting selective incapacitation he favors "categori-
cal incapacitation," which also would require longer imprisonment for 
categories of offenders predicted to be more dangerous than other cat-
egories. The length of incapacitation, however, would depend on the 
recidivism associated with the category into which the crime commit-
ted falls, rather than on the predicted recidivism of the individual. 
Thus, the sentence for all those who have committed the same crime 
would be the same. Professor von Hirsch hopes to make sure that the 
categorically incapacitative sentences are proportionate to the serious-
ness of the crimes. But it is hard to reconcile sentences according to 
desert with sentences according to categorically (and precariously) 
predicted recidivism. To the extent to which a sentence is based on 
predicted recidivism, the sentence may not be what the crime deserves, 
if desert refers to the past, as it must. 
Yet Professor von Hirsch need not have worried about how to rec-
oncile prolonged incapacitation based on predictions of dangerousness 
with punishment according to desert. Convicts could be punished ac-
cording to desert as he proposes. Those deemed dangerous, by cate-
gorical or selective prediction, still could be confined until no longer 
dangerous. Such additional confinement need be regarded as punish-
ment no more than the confinement of the insane need be morally 
deserved. We confine some of the insane against their will not because 
they are blameworthy, nor even because they are insane, but because 
they are dangerous. We may similarly incapacitate offenders certain 
to endanger us in the proximate future. Incapacitation here is not a 
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punishment but a means of social protection. Although we cannot 
punish him for what he has not, as yet, done, we can incapacitate 
someone we know to be about to commit a murder. I do not see the 
philosophical difficulty which Professor van Hirsch strives so mightily 
to overcome. He creates it by unnecessarily conflating incapacitation 
with punishment. Actually, punishment is only one of several possible 
purposes of incapacitation, which can be imposed independently, as is 
done with the insane. The real difficulty is empirical and suffices to 
discard preemptive incapacitation of offenders beyond the punishment 
deserved: We are unable to predict with enough accuracy the danger-
ousness of individuals. Unlike Professor van Hirsch, I do not think 
our ability to predict the dangerousness of categories is adequate 
either. 
Professor van Hirsch compromises "just deserts" not only by re-
luctantly favoring categorical incapacitation, but also by enthusiasti-
cally asking courts to consider the availability of prison space in 
sentencing, as though judges were real estate agents. Surely it is for 
legislators, not for sentencers, to consider the availability of prison 
space and either to build more prisons as needed, or to reduce prison 
terms if preferred. It is hard to see why crowding of prisons (or vacan-
cies) could decrease (or increase) the just deserts of convicts. 
Is R.ETRIBUTIONIST THEORY SUFFICIENT? 
If desert is as necessary a criterion of punishment as Professor von 
Hirsch claims, is it as sufficient as he claims? In its pure form retribu-
tionist theory proposes punishment according to desert, regardless of 
effects on the criminal - such as rehabilitation, or incapacitation -
and regardless of deterrent effects. Retributionists do not deny such 
effects. After all, most punishments will incapacitate offenders at least 
temporarily, thereby reducing their ability to commit crimes. Further, 
the anticipation of retribution is likely to deter some future offenders. 
However, retributionists resolutely disregard these effects as sentenc-
ing criteria, since they are irrelevant to the moral desert which retribu-
tionists see as the only justification for punishment. Perhaps it is. 
Certainly moral desert is the only moral justification for punishment; 
but we cannot really know what punishment crimes deserve; where-
fore the just desert principle is not sufficient to determine a punish-
ment scale. 
According to just deserts theory, the seriousness of the crime alone 
should determine the pup.ishment deserved. Seriousness, in tum, de-
pends on the harm done and on the culpability of the offender. Surely 
both are relevant. But since harm is always a consequence and often a 
contingent one, from Professor von Hirsch's deontological (certainly 
nonconsequentialist) standpoint the wickedness of the intent alone 
might be expected to count. However, this would· make the just 
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deserts criterion quite impractical. Professor von Hirsch, therefore, 
remains wisely silent on culpability versus harm. We are not told 
whether more punishment is deserved by an offender who is very cul-
pable (his crime was premeditated) but does little harm (he did not 
succeed in poisoning his wife: by accident he gave her sugar instead of 
strychnine) or by one who does great harm but was merely negligent. 
Which crime is more "serious"? 
Professor von Hirsch further appears to believe that the compara-
tive seriousness of crimes can be determined in all cases. Not so. 
Comparative seriousness can be determined only for some crimes, and 
it does not fully determine the comparative punishment deserved. If 
rape is a crime and murder is a crime, rape-murder must be more 
serious than either. Does rape-murder deserve the sum of the punish-
ments meted out for rape and for murder? More? Less? Even when 
crimes are nearly homogeneous, assigning seriousness is arbitrary: Is 
rape more serious than assault with a deadly weapon? Is burglary 
more serious than fraud when fraud does more harm? What about 
mishandling toxic waste? Ordinal determinations of seriousness be-
come altogether arbitrary when the seriousness of heterogeneous 
crimes must be compared. The law somehow settles these matters. 
But just deserts theory offers no rational criterion of comparative seri-
ousness, no guide to legislators. 
Once we have decided that crime A is more serious than crime B, 
we still have to decide how much more, if we want to decide how 
much more punishment is deserved. However, ordinal criteria tell us, 
at best, thatA is more serious thatB, not how much more. Hence, our 
decision on how much more punishment A deserves is arbitrary. Pro-
fessor von Hirsch offers us no principle on which to base it. He dis-
cusses "cardinal proportionality" as if it somehow could tell how 
much more serious A is than B. It does not. It merely labels the 
problem without solving it. Possibly his "cardinal proportionality" 
also refers to the relationship between the seriousness of the crime and 
what is deserved for it. However, "cardinal proportionality" neither 
justifies the degree of seriousness assigned to crimes nor the punish-
ment deserved for that degree. 
Just deserts fails even more fundamentally to tell us what is de-
served for any crime. Suppose we agree that murder is a serious crime 
and burglary a less serious one. Thus murder deserves more punish-
ment than burglary, though nothing tells us how much more. But 
what does murder deserve in the first place? Execution? Life in 
prison? Twenty years? Ten? Just deserts theory cannot tell. Profes-
sor von Hirsch appears to deal with the problem under the heading of 
"anchoring the penalty scale"; but he does not really address it. Thus, 
contrary to what he appears to believe, there is no way of determining 
whether any penalty scale is "inflated or deflated" in terms of what is 
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deserved. The just deserts criterion does not justify his opinion that 
murder deserves X any more than it justifies mine that murder de-
serves 2X. Just deserts seems to be a question masquerading as the 
answer. The question seems quite justified. Unfortunately no answer 
can be. 
Politicians may be guided by the answers people actually give 
when asked what punishments are deserved for various crimes. These 
answers indicate what is desired and acceptable. However, they 
mainly reflect the customary scale of punishments and cannot be the 
basis for a "correct" scale. The people, no more than the philoso-
phers, can give any reason for believing that burglary deserves five 
years in prison and murder fifteen, rather than three and nine, or three 
and six. To be sure, no system in need of public support can afford 
penalties that greatly deviate from popular opinion. Still, that opinion 
about what is right, or just, is no more than an opinion. A theory of 
punishment which, in effect, simply tells us that whatever punishments 
are popularly accepted are ipso facto just, or right, scarcely deserves to 
be called a theory. A theory is meant to shape opinion according to 
justifiable rational principles, rather than merely to follow it. 
Theories which propose punishments according to expected reha-
bilitative, incapacitative, or deterrent effects may be morally faulty and 
empirically unfounded. Yet they are superior to just deserts theory in 
that they offer, in principle (though not necessarily in practice), a test 
for the appropriateness of punishments: the punishment that rehabili-
tates, or incapacitates the dangerous, or deters prospective offenders is 
the appropriate punishment. Just deserts theory insists that punish-
ment be what is deserved by the seriousness of the crime. But we are 
not told how to measure seriousness or how to relate it to punishment. 
For this reason I think Professor von Hirsch's "impatience'' with "at-
tempts to treat justice as anything but central" (p. 172) is misplaced. 
Retribution must play a role, but scarcely a central one, since it cannot 
tell us how to punish crimes. 
Professor von Hirsch's "impatience" is wrongheaded for another 
reason as well. He appears to be concerned about justice to convicts, 
who, he thinks, may be victimized by excessive punishment (punish-
ment beyond what he thinks is deserved). But even if disproportionate 
to the crime - whatever that means - punishment is not unjust to 
the criminal. Society does have an interest in avoiding unwise or ex-
cessive punishments, but not because such punishments are unjust to 
convicts. A punishment cannot be unjust to the convict, who has vol-
unteered to commit a crime and, thereby, to assume the risk of suffer-
ing the legally prescribed punishment. He could have avoided the 
risk. If what he volunteered to risk does occur, he suffers an injustice 
no more than a man who risked his fortune gambling does when he 
loses it. The convict, or the gambler, suffered a misfortune which may 
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kindle our compassion; but neither suffered an injustice. There is no 
injustice in suffering what one volunteered to take the risk of suffering. 
Justice does not protect against risks, however exorbitant, one volun-
teers to assume. The punishment prescribed by law may be less or 
more than the crime deserved by some reckoning. The punishment 
may be, as it were, unjust (disproportionate) to the crime. But the 
punishment cannot be unjust to the criminal, since he volunteered to 
assume the risk of suffering it. Professor von Hirsch is mistaken in 
conflating punishment disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime 
with injustice to the criminal. 
We must try to mete out sentences according to what is felt to be 
deserved by the crime, because the criminal justice system needs gen-
eral support which is predicated on a popular feeling that the system 
does justice according to desert. But, contrary to Professor von 
Hirsch's claim, the just deserts principle does not prescribe a scale of 
penalties, or enable us to do so, beyond suggesting that punishments 
must be felt to be deserved, that is, felt somehow to retribute (pay 
back) for the moral and material injuries crimes cause. The lex ta-
lionis, which originally limited private vengeance, cannot determine 
public retribution which is meant to vindicate the law. Therefore we 
do not limit the time for which we confine a kidnapper to the time for 
which he confined his victim. Neither do we torture torturers. There 
need not be an equivalence of suffering. Retribution is circumscribed, 
albeit vaguely, only by our sense of proportion. 
COULD INCAPACITATION HELP? 
The ''just deserts" theory tries to answer a moral question: What 
punishments are morally deserved? Since the theory does not ask the 
consequentialist question - what punishments will control crime? -
it cannot be expected to answer it. However, Professor von Hirsch 
hopes that "categorical incapacitation" will help control the crime rate 
because the incapacitation of likely recidivists will reduce crime. Most 
criminologists accept this idea in some form; so do most prosecutors. 
Yet incapacitation of likely recidivists is irrelevant to controlling most 
crime. 
Criminologists traditionally want to know why some people com-
mit crimes occasionally, others frequently, and still others not at all. 
Few concern themselves with a question which seems far more rele-
vant to crime control: Why is the crime rate what it is - why is it 
neither higher nor lower? The answer suggests that incapacitation of 
future career criminals per se (i.e., independent of deterrent effects) 
cannot be effective in controlling most crimes. Even incapacitation of 
all convicted offenders would not be. 
Ifwe incapacitated the dentists who currently see most patients, or 
the most active prostitutes, or if we incapacitated all practicing den-
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tists or prostitutes, the rate of dentistry, or prostitution, would be re-
duced - but only temporarily. It would return within a short time to 
what it was. Because demand would not be affected while the supply 
of these services would be reduced, the price would rise and attract 
newcomers until as many persons would render dental or sexual serv-
ices as before, whereupon the price would fall back to the old level. To 
be sure, not everybody is capable of becoming a dentist, or a prosti-
tute, and many are unwilling at any price. Normally, however, there 
are enough capable persons willing to replace incapacitated practition-
ers if the price is right. The price that attracted the previous number 
of practitioners will do so again. The effect of incapacitation on the 
rate at which most crimes are committed does not differ from the ef-
fect of incapacitation on the rate of dentistry or prostitution. Incapac-
itation would have some short-term but no long-term effect on most 
crimes. 
Many crimes are market-dependent: they become profitable only 
as the proceeds (or, in the case of prostitution, the services themselves) 
are sold. That is why prices play so important a role. Theft, car theft, 
truck hijacking, and burglary are market-dependent. Incapacitation 
per se (apart from deterrence) has only short-term effects on the rate 
at which market-dependent crimes occur. They become more lucra-
tive (prices rise) as practitioners are incapacitated. This attracts more 
newcomers until the price of stolen goods (or unlawful services) falls 
to the original level. Thus the rate (say of car theft) would not change 
in the end. Incapacitation causes different, but not fewer persons to 
engage in criminal activity. 
Other crimes such as rape, or the taking of money, do not depend 
on a market since there is no market for rape and no need to sell 
money. Therefore, rape does not become more lucrative, or attractive, 
through incapacitation of .convicted rapists. While deactivating some 
rapists, incapacitation would not attract newcomers and might reduce 
the rate at which rape is committed by repeat offenders. (The incapac-
itation of one-time offenders would make no difference.)6 
Most criminals, however, do not specialize. The burglar is a rapist 
as well, dependent on opportunity. It follows that incapacitation of 
rapists may accomplish little, even with respect to rape, since it would 
not reduce the rate of burglary and incidental rape. Further, although 
there certainly are high- and low-rate offenders, the notion of career 
criminals - persons who remain high-rate offenders when others 
taper off owing to advancing age - is questionable. It seems likely 
that both high- and low-rate offenders reach their peak by age eighteen 
6. As more rapists, or robbers, are incapacitated, however, the unused opportunities for rape 
and robbery would increase. As better opportunities become available the net gain from these 
crimes would rise, making them more attractive and thereby enticing more newcomers. This 
may or may not offset the reduction of these crimes by incapacitation of repeat offenders. 
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and begin to taper off in their twenties. Thus, unless they are incapaci-
tated between the ages of fourteen and twenty, incapacitation would 
lock the door after the period of maximal criminal activity of those 
incapacitated has passed. 7 
DETERRENCE DETERMINES CRIME RATES 
The rate at which crimes are committed generally depends on the 
net advantage they are expected to yield compared to the alternatives 
available to criminals. The comparative net advantage of crime con-
sists of the material or psychological benefit expected less the expected 
cost to the criminal. The main cost to the criminal is punishment -
the threatened punishment discounted by the improbability of suffer-
ing it. (The threatened legal punishment itself is only the list price 
which no criminal expects to pay.) 
The gross benefit of crime to the criminal is hard to change by any 
governmental policy. The cost to the criminal, which codetermines 
the net benefit, however, depends on the probability and severity of 
punishment. Given the severity of punishment, society can manipu-
late, to some extent, the probability of suffering it; and society can 
readily determine severity. Either way, the cost of crime to the crimi-
nal can be changed and therewith the net benefit to him. 8 Thus the 
crime rate, ceteris paribus, depends on the punishment society is will-
ing to impose on criminals. Prospective criminals react to incentives 
and disincentives as do most people. They react to changes in incen-
tives and disincentives more sensitively than persons already commit-
ted to crime. Incentives and disincentives influence the formation of 
habits, criminal or not, more than they affect habits already formed. 
In this respect, criminals react as other groups do: changes in the 
wages of miners will influence prospective miners more than those 
who are already in the pits.9 
A caveat may be apposite. No conscious calculation of costs and 
benefits by prospective criminals is implied. They do not consciously 
calculate any more than prospective dentists or purchasers (or 
nonpurchasers) of Rolls Royces do. People usually adapt their behav-
ior to incentives and disincentives without explicit or conscious calcu-
lations. Only those who wish to predict the effects of incentives and 
disincentives must calculate. Those to whom the incentives or disin-
centives are offered need not. The rats to whom experimenters offer 
7. On this matter see Gottfredson & Hirschi, The True Value of Lambda Would Appear to be 
Zero, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 213 (1986). 
8. Punishment is the only cost to the offender which the criminal justice system can influence 
directly. Other costs he may bear - e.g., guilt feelings - are hard to influence by social 
measures. Still other factors such as age, genes, sex, family, income, religion, custom, and social 
structure also play a role. But they are not readily subject to social control. 
9. Much research on deterrence only observes effects on criminal habits and not on habit 
formation. 
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incentives or disincentives do not calculate. Yet we observe that they 
are guided by the incentives and disincentives which become part of 
their environment. Io 
The disincentive effect of punishment threats can be calculated in 
principle: an increase in severity and/ or probability of punishment 
will lead, ceteris paribus, to a decrease of crime. The extent depends 
on the elasticity of the supply of crime, which must be established by 
observation. Thus, a coherent and nonarbitrary scale of punishments 
which determines the cost of crimes to criminals (and thus the net 
gain) could be worked out. I I It would not directly depend on ''just 
deserts," but on the moral and material considerations which may (or 
may not) lead us to prefer more punishment to more crime. Crime 
can be deterred to the degree to which society is willing to bear the 
moral and material costs of the punishments needed to deter it. I 2 In 
effect, for each kind of crime the question would be: Do we want to 
reduce it by X, if this means increasing the punishment for it by Y? 13 
(Disincentives are never costless, although often likely to cost less than 
the crimes they deter.) 
The arbitrary sanctions regarded as just deserts are not meant, nor 
are they likely, to control crime. Neither does incapacitation. But a 
deterrent scale of punishment will. Such a deterrent scale can be con-
sistent with deserts, although independent of them, since the just 
deserts criterion does not actually determine, or exclude, any specific 
scale of punishments. 
A rational scale of punishments controls crime by reducing the 
rate at which each crime is committed to the rate we are willing to 
10. I use the word "environment" to stress that, contrary to factitious dichotomies, legal 
incentives and disincentives can be just as much a part of the environment as natural ones - a 
point that has been ignored ever since Enrico Ferri first ignored it in his seminal CRIMINAL 
SOCIOLOGY 76 (1896). 
11. Punishments would almost entirely depend on their consequences, the crime rates they 
allow. Thus, punishments would be objectively determined, once the community, or its legisla-
tors, have made a value judgement to decide what crime rates to tolerate rather than bear the 
cost of altering them. The material cost and the material benefit of punishments are knowable, 
but a value judgement about the moral cost and the moral benefit still is required. This, however, 
would be the only value judgement needed to determine the size of punishments ordinally and 
cardinally. In contrast, any retributive scale of punishments requires value judgements about the 
seriousness of each crime, the punishment appropriate to that seriousness, and the size of the 
differences between crimes and between punishments. None of these judgements would be re-
lated to consequences. All punishments would be determined by deontic moral judgements 
based on intuition and tradition. 
12. Philosophers often have objected that, to use punishments as a means to deter, is, imper-
missibly, to use convicts as mere means for social ends not their own. Since, however, the 
criminals (hoping to attain their own ends) have volunteered for the risk of being so used, this 
venerable objection lacks merit. 
13. A minimal crime rate would remain, even if disincentives were maximized, because some 
persons do not respond to any disincentive. Moreover, as disincentives increased there would be· 
diminishing reductions in the crime rate. (There is no indication that this point has been reached 
in the United States.) Finally, the greater availability of criminal opportunities, see note 6 supra, 
would encourage some newcomers. 
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tolerate rather than bear the moral and material cost of further reduc-
tion. This scale of punishments may also serve to satisfy the indepen-
dently perceived demands of justice, for the punishment that reduces 
the crime as desired (in view of the cost of further reduction) may be 
the punishment the crime is perceived to deserve. Both the desire to 
deter and to exact retribution depend on the perceived seriousness of 
the crime.14 
Professor von Hirsch's Past and Future Crimes takes "just deserts" 
theory just about as far as it will go - which is not quite far enough. 
Still, his book contains many stimulating observations and arguments 
and makes a major contribution to the exhaustion of possibilities. 
14. The punishment needed to deter also depends on the attractiveness of a crime which may 
not coincide with its seriousness. 
